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The  controllability principle says  that  an  individual  should be rewarded  on 
the  basis  of  what  he  controls.  This  paper  studies  this  principle  from  a 
principal agent point of view.  A  dynamic mul tiple agent model is constructed 
and  the  controllability  principle  is  compared  wi th  the  agency  model's 
solution.  It is shown that from  a  principal agent's point of view all results 
that give information about an individual's action should be used to determine 
his remuneration. 
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Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  controllability 
principle from  a  principal agent point of view.  This management 
principle  says  that  an  individual  should  be  evaluated  and 
rewarded  on  the  basis  of  what  he  controls  [Choudhury  (1986, 
p.382),  Milgrom and Roberts  (1992,  p.220)].  With respect to the 
controllability  principle  three  different  problems  can  be 
defined:  the  measurement  standard  problem,  the  mUltiple  agent 
problem  and  the  mUltiple  period  problem.  The  measurement 
standard  problem  deals  with  the  measurement  standard  used  to 
reward  an  individual.  This  problem has  already been studied in 
the  literature  before  [Antle  and  Demski  (1988),  Holmstrom 
(1982)] . 
The  mUltiple  agent  problem  considers  the  question  of  relative 
performance  measurement.  An  individual's  evaluation  and 
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compensation  can  depend  on  the  results  of  other  individuals 
(agents).  The  multiperiod problem  deals  with  the  introduction 
of  other period elements  in  the  evaluation  and  remuneration  of 
an  agent.  These  problems  are  studied  in  this  paper  from  a 
dynamic  multiple  agent  point  of  view.  This  combination  of 
mUltiple  agents  and  mUltiple  periods  has  not  been  investigated 
yet  in the principal agent  literature. 
The  basic principal  agent  model  has  been  extensively discussed 
in  literature  [Bamberg  and  Spremann  (1987)/  Grossman  and  Hart 
(1983) /  Holmstrom  (1979) /  Kreps  (1990) /  Rasmusen  (1989) /  Ross 
(1973) /  Shavell  (1979) /  Strong and Walker  (1987)].  The multiple 
agent extension introduces  supplementary agents  into the model. 
A distinction can be made  between tournaments  [(Green and Stokey 
(1983) /  Malcolmson  (1986) /  Mookherjee  (1984) /  Nalebuff  and 
Stiglitz  (1983)]  and principal agent contracts with moral hazard 
[Holmstrom  (1982) /  Mookherjee  (1984) /  Holmstrom  and  Milgrom 
(1990)]  or/and adverse selection  [Demski  and Sappington  (1984) / 
Picard  (1987)  and  Zou  (1992)].  The  multiple  period  extension 
deals with a  repeated principal agent  relationship.  The  number 
of  periods  can  be  infinite  [Malueg  (1986) /  Radner  (1985) / 
Rubinstein and Yaari  (1983) /  Spear and Srivastava  (1987)]  or fi-
nite  [Fellingham,  Newman and Suh  (1985) /  Fudenberg,  Holmstrom and 
Milgrom  (1990) /  Laffont and Tirole  (1988) /  Lambert  (1983/  1984) / 
Malcolmson and Spinnewyn  (1988) /  Radner  (1981) /  Rogerson  (1985) ] . 
The  first section introduces the two period mUltiple agent model 
with moral  hazard.  It is assumed that effort in one  period has 
no  effect  on  other period results  and  that  agents  cannot  leave 
the  principal.  A  second  section confronts  the  controllability 
principle  and  the  principal  agent  answer  with  respect  to  the 
evaluation and remuneration of the agents.  In the third section 
an  example  is  presented  to  illustrate  the  difference  between 
control  and  information. 
important  conclusions. 
A  fourth  section  summarizes  the  most 3 
I.  The  dynamic  mUltiple  agent  model 
The  model  presented  consists  of  one  principal  and  two  agents, 
where  principal  and  agents  precommit  to  a  two-period  contract. 
The  principal  promises  to  employ  the  agents  for  two  periods. 
Both  agents  agree  not  to  leave  the  principal  after  the  first 
period.  Each  agent  chooses  an  action  in  every period.  These 
actions are taken out of some  finite sets Ata,  with Ata the finite 
set of  actions  of  agent  a  in period t.  The  principal  observes 
a  result  from  a  finite  set  Xta  for agent  a  in period t. 
Every  first  period  action  combination  induces 
distribution  on  the  first  period  results. 
a  probability 
We  denote  by 
action  pair  (a/, a/)  is  chosen.  Every  combination  of  first 
period  results  is  possible  under  every  combination  of  first 
period actions.  The  joint probability of  result pair  (X2~,X2;) 
resulting  if  the  second  period  action  combination  (a/, a22)  is 
chosen  can  be  written as  ITk1(ai,ai)  .  This  implies  that  second 
period results cannot  be  influenced by first period actions. 
These  results  can be  used to determine  the  compensation of  both 
agents  in  the  two  periods.  First period compensations  sla(i,j) 
can be based on both first period results.  Second period results 
can  be  used,  in  combination  with  first  period  results,  to 
determine the agents'  compensation s2a(i,j,k,l)  in the second pe-
riod.  An  agent's  incentive  scheme  is  a  scheme  where  a  first 
period remuneration is determined for every possible first period 
result combination  (Xlil , xl/)  and a  second period remuneration for 
every  possible  combination  of  first  and  second  period  results 
(  1  2  1  2)  Xli  'X1j  I  X2k  I  X21  • 
The  dynamic  multiple  agent  model  considered  in  this  paper 
consists  of  three  stages.  In  the  first  stage  the  principal 4 
announces  the  agents'  incentive  schemes.  The  agents  observe 
these  schemes  and  use  them  to  choose  their  strategies.  In  a 
second stage both agents simultaneously choose their first period 
actions  out  of  Ala.  Nature  determines,  together with  the  first 
period action combination,  the probability distribution on first 
period results.  First period results are  observed by the prin-
cipal  and  both  agents.  These  results,  together  with  the 
principal's incentive scheme,  determine the compensation of both 
agents  in  the  first  period.  In  a  third  stage  the  agents 
simultaneously  choose  their  second  period  actions  out  of  A2a. 
Nature determines,  together with the second period action combi-
nation,  the  probability distribution on  second  period results. 
Second  period  results  are  observed  and  both  agents  are 
remunerated  on  the  basis  of  first  and  second  period  results, 
according to the principal's incentive  scheme .. 
The  principal's  strategy is  the  determination  of  both  agents' 
incentive  schemes.  Agents  choose  first  and  second  period 
actions.  A  different  second  period  action  may  be  chosen  for 
different first period result combinations  (Xlil , xl/).  We  denote 
by  a2a(i,j)  the  strategy of  agent  a  in  the  second period if  Xlil 
is the observed result of  the first agent  and  xl/  is the  result 
of  the  second agent  in the first period. 
The agents' utility functions are permitted to vary with time and 
are  given by: 
Ula  =  utility function  of  agent  a  in period  1 
=  V:(s:(i,j))  - G:(a:) 
U2a  = utility function of  agent  a  in period  2 
=  V2a(s2a(i,j,k,l))  - G2a(a2a(i,j)) 
vta  are  convex  and  Gta  are  concave  functions. 5 
The  principal is supposed to be  risk neutral.  He  maximizes  his 
expected  benefits  minus  expected  compensations. 
benefits are given by 
B (a; , a{ , ai (i  , j) , a; (i  , j) ) 
=  Li L j ilij (a;, a{)  [F 1 (X;i' X{j)  + Lk Ll  ilk] (ai (i, j) ,a; (i, j) ) F2 (Xik' X;l)  ] 
Expected 
(1 ) 
The  functions  Fl  and  F2  associate with every possible combination 
of  results  in  the  periods  considered  a  gross  benefit  for  the 
principal.  Given  strategy combinations 
(a11{a/{a/(i{j) (a22(i{j))  and  incentive  schemes 
(Sll(i{j) (s/(i{j) (s2:L(i{j{k{1) (s/(i{j{k{l))  the expected costs of 
the principal equal 
c(a;,a{,ai(i,j) ,a;(i,j) ,s;(i,j) ,s{(i,j) ,si(i,j,k,l) ,s;(i,j,k,l)) 
(2 ) 
Analogous  to  the  Grossman-Hart  analysis  of  the  basic  agency 
problem  (1983)  the maximization problem of  the principal  can be 
decomposed  into  two  stages.  In  a  first  step  the  least  costly 
incentive scheme for every strategy combination of the two agents 
In  both  periods  is  derived.  For  each  possible  strategy 
combinations  (a11{a/{a/(i{j){a/(i{j))  (2)  is  minimized  with 
respect  to  (s/(i{j) (s12(i{j) (s/(i{j{k{l) (s/(i{j{k{l)).  In  a 
second step the best strategy combination is chosen.  This means 
that  [(1)  (2)]  is maximized with respect  to 
(a11{a12{a/(i{j) (a22(i{j)).  Properties  of  the  optimal  incentive 
scheme  can be deduced from the first stage minimization problem. 
New  variables  can be  defined: 
V1a(Sla(i,j))  =  v1a(i{j) 
V2a (s2a(i,j{k{1))  =  v2a(i{j{k,l) 
These variables are the levels of utility the agents enjoy.  Let 
h1a  and h2a be the inverse cost of utility functions of V1a  and V2a. 
This  means  that 
hl  a (v  1 a ( i ( j ))  =  s :La  ( i  ( j ) 
h2 a (v  2  a ( i { j {  k ( 1))  =  s 2  a ( i  , j {  k ( 1 ) 6 
The  problem2  of  minimizing  (2)  can  be  written  using  the  new 
decision  variables. 
following  expression  (3)  1S  minimized with respect  to 
(V11(irj) rv/(irj) rv/(irjrkr l ) rv/(irj rkrl)). 
Min Li Lj Ilij Ca~,  a~)  [h; (v; (i,j)) +h{ (v{ (i,j)) 
+ Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) (hi (vi (i  , j  , k, 1) ) + hi (vi (i,  j  , k, 1) ) ) ] 
s. t. 1)  Li Lj Ilij  (a~,  a~)  [v; (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) 
vi (i,  j  , k, 1) -Gi (a~ (i  , j) ) ] - G; (a~) ~el 
Li Lj Ilij  (a~,  a~)  [v{ (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) 
vi (i,j  ,k,  1) -Gi (a~ (i,j))]- G{ (a~) ~e2 
s. t. 2)  Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i  , j) ,a~ (i, j) ) vi (i  , j  , k, 1) -Gi (a~ (i, j) ) ~ 
Lk L1 Ilkl (ai (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) vi (i, j,  k, 1) -Gi (ai (i, j))  \/(i,j),  \/ai (i, j) 
L k  L  1 Ilk1  (a~ (i  , j) , a~ (i  , j) ) vi (i  , j  , k, 1) - Gi (a~ (i, j) ) ~ 
Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,ai (i, j) ) vi (i, j,  k, 1) -Gi (ai (i, j))  \/(i,j) , \/ai (i, j) 
s. t. 3)  Li Lj  Ilij  (a~,  a~)  [v; (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) 
vi (i,j  ,k, 1) -Gi  (a~ (i,j))] - G; (ai)  ~ 
Li Lj Ilij (a;  , a~)  [v; (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) , a~ (i ,j)  ) 
vi(i,j,k,l)-Gi(a;(i,j))] - G;(a;)  \/a; 
Li Lj Ilij (ai, a~)  [v{ (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1  (a~ (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) 
vi (i, j  , k, 1) -Gi (a~ (i  , j) ) ]  - G{  (a~) ~ 
Li Lj Ilij (ai, a{)  [v{ (i, j) + Lk L1 Ilk1 (a; (i, j) ,a~ (i, j) ) 
vi(i,j,k,1)-Gi(a~(i,j))]- G{(a{)  \/a{ 
the 
(3 ) 
The  first  constraint  is  the  participation  condition  for  both 
agents.  Both agents  require  a  minimum  expected utility ea  over 
the  two  period  horizonr  when  viewed  from  the  beginning  of  the 
first  period.  The  second  constraint  is  the  incentive 
compatibility constraint  for  both  agents  in  the  second period. 
2  We  refer to Grossman  and Hart  (1983)  for  a  discussion of 
existence problems  associated with this minimization problem. 7 
A  subgame  perfect  Nash  equilibrium3  is  used  to  determine  the 
agents'  strategies.  When  an  agent  comes  to  the  second period, 
he  chooses  his  second  period  action  conditional  upon  the 
information  he  has  at  that  moment.  A  different  second  period 
action  may  be  optimal  from  the  principal's  point  of  view  for 
different  combinations  of  first  period  results4 •  The  third 
constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint in the first 
period.  Given  the optimal  second period strategies,  each agent 
chooses a  first period action to maximize his two period expected 
utility. 
II.  Control  and  information in the  dynamic  mUltiple agent  model 
An  agent's first and second period remuneration can respectively 
depend on results from the sets X1 a  and Xt a •  The central question 
of  this  paper  is  the  presence  of  a  given  result  in  the 
principal's incentive scheme.  The controllability principle and 
the dynamic mUltiple agent problem give different answers to this 
question.  The  remainder  of  this  section  will  consider  the 
incentive  scheme  of  the  first agent. 
Three  effects can be defined in a  dynamic  multiple agent  model. 
The  information effect considers the  introduction of  the second 
agent's first period result  j  in V11(i,j)  and the  second agent's 
second  period  result  1  in v/(i,j,k,l)  The  time  effect  deals 
with  the  dependency  of  the  first  agent's  second  period 
remuneration v 21(i,j,k,l)  on his  own  first period result i.  The 
third  (combined)  effect  looks  at  the  use  of  the  second  agent's 
first period result  j  in v 21(i,j,k,l). 
3  A problem of mUltiple equilibria can arise in this model. 
Given the optimal incentive scheme to implement a  subgame perfect 
Nash  equilibrium,  it is possible  that  both agents  can  increase 
their  utilities  by  choosing  another  subgame  perfect  Nash 
equilibrium.  Ma  (1988)  provides  a  cost  less  solution  for  this 
problem in a  one  period mUltiple  agent principal agent  problem. 
4  The  notion  subgame  perfect Nash  equilibrium is used in  a 
rather unusual way,  because subgames begin at decision nodes that· 
begin  at  combinations  of  first  period  results  and  are  no 
singleton information sets. 8 
We  first  present  a  formal  definition  of  the  controllability 
principle.  Because it is assumed that effort in one period has 
no  effect  on  the  results  in  the  other  period,  the 
controllability  principle  says  that  the  evaluation  and 
remuneration of an agent in a  given period should be  independent 
of  other  period  results.  This  means  that  v 2l(i,j,k,l)  is 
independent  of  first period results  i  and j. 
The  first  agent  controls  the  second  agent's  result  if  the 
marginal probability function on that result,  given the actions 
of the second agent,  is a  nontrivial function of his own actions. 
Define  1Tj (all, a/)  as  the  marginal  probability  of  the  second 
agent's  first  period  result  given  action  combination  (all,a/). 
The  controllability  principle  tells  us  that  the  first  period 
evaluation and remuneration of the first agent should be indepen-
dent  of  the first period result of  the  second agent  if 
(3 ) 
The  first agent does not control the second agent's first period 
result  if,  given  the  second  agent's  action,  he  is not  able  to 
affect  the  probability distribution  of  this  result  by  his  own 
actions.  According  to  the  controllability principle,  v/ (i, j) 
should then be  independent  of  j. 
Define  1T1 (a/, a/)  as  the  marginal  probability  of  the  second 
agent's  second period result given action  combination  (a2l,a22). 
The  second  period  remuneration  of  the  first  agent  v 2l (i,j,k,l) 
should be independent of the second agent's second period result 
if 
(4 ) 
The controllability principle can be confronted with the princi-
pal  agent  solution.  Whereas  effort in one  period has  no  effect 
on the other period results,  an agent's second period evaluation 
and  remuneration will  depend  on his  own  first period result. Proposi tion  1 5 
The  second period incentive  scheme  of an  agent will  depend 
on his own  first period result. 
9 
Proposition  1  considers  the  time  effect and means  that 
v 21 (i,j,k,l)  will  always  depend  on  i.  Because  i  gives 
information about  a/ it will also  be  used  in v/(i,j,k,l).  This 
gives a  supplementary possibility to use the information content 
of i. 
In  order to better understand principal  agent  conclusions  with 
respect  to  the  introduction  of  results  of  other  agents  in  the 
remuneration  of  a  given  agent,  we  descibe  the  concept  of 
sufficient  statistics.  Denote  by  x  any  data  and  by 
1~(81,82))  the  probability of  the  data  given  parameters  e1  and 
e2 •  Any  function  t(x)  of  the  data is called a  statistic. 
statistical theory it is known  that 
From 
sufficient statistic for e  1.  This means  that llx ( t  (x) ,81 ,82 )  does 
not  involve  e1 •  This  definition  is  equivalent  [Lindley  (1965), 
Theorem I,  p.46]  to the definition of De  Groot,  where  a  statistic 
t  (x)  is  defined  as  a  sufficient  statistic  for  e  "if,  for  any 
prior distribution of  e1 ,  its posterior distribution depends  on 
the  observed value of  x  only through t(x)"  [De  Groot  (1970)]  or 
that given parameter e2  an analysis based on t  (x),  the sufficient 
statistic,  is just as effective as  an analysis based on all data 
x.  It is also  equivalent  [Lindley  (1965),  Theorem  2,  p.47]  to 
Holmstrom's  (1982)  sufficient statistic formulation. 
5  We  refer to Appendix  I  for  the proof of  Propositions 
1  to 4. 10 
Propositions  2  to  4  introduce  principal  agent  conclusions  with 
respect to the use other agents'  results in an incentive scheme. 
Proposition  2 
The  first agent's  first period optimal  remuneration is 
independent of the  second agent's first period result if his 
own  first period result is a  sufficient statistic for his 
first period action  choice or6 
II  .  I  -2  II  '-2 
j  ( ~  , al , al ) =  j  ( ~  , al )  Vat,Vi,Vj 
(5 ) 
Proposition 2  considers the first period information effect.  The 
first period remuneration Vll(i,j)  will not  be  affected by  j  if 
i  is  a  sufficient statistic for  all 
Proposition  3 
The  first agent's  second period remuneration is independent 
of the  second agent's second period result if his own  second 
period result is a  sufficient statistic for his second period 
action  choice or 
(6 ) 
Proposition 3  looks at the second period information effect.  The 
first  agent's  second  period  remuneration  v/(i,j,k,l)  will  be 
independent  of  1  if k  is  a  sufficient statistic for  a 21 
6  Stronger results will be derived in Appendix I.  There is 
a  difference  between  the  sufficient  statistic  concept  and  the 
conditions  in  Appendix  I.  Whereas  the  sufficient  statistic 
condition has to hold for all possible actions,  the condition in 
Appendix  I  is  limited  to  those  actions  where  the  Lagrange 
multiplier is strictly positive. 11 
Proposition  4 
The  first agent's  second period remuneration is independent 
of the  first period result of the  second agent if the  first 
period resul  t  of the first agent is a  sufficient statistic for 
his  first period action  choice or7 
II ( .  1  -2)  II ( . -2) 
j  1-! a 1  ! a I  =  j  _  1- ! aI_ 
(5 ) 
This last Proposition deals with the combined effect.  If j  gives 
supplementary  information  with  respect  to  all  (information 
effect), it will also be used to determine v 21(i,j,k,l).  This is 
an extension of  the  time effect described in Proposition 1. 
The  controllability principle introduces  a  result in an agent's 
incentive  scheme  if  it  is  controlled  by  the  agent's  action 
choice.  The  principal  agent  solution stresses  the  information 
content  of  the  results  considered.  If  a  result  gives 
supplementary  information  with  respect  to  an  agent's  actions, 
this result  should be  used  for  the  agent's remuneration. 
III.  An  example 
A  simple  example  with  two  possible  actions  and  two  possible 
results  for  both  agents  in  every  period  is  presented.  The 
probability distributions on first and second period results are 
given  in Tables  1  and  2. 
The  first  agent  controls  his  own  results  and  the  second  agent 
controls the results of both agents in every period.  This means 
that,  following the controllability principle, Vll(i,j)  should be 
independent of  j  and v 21 (i,j,k,l)  should not be  influenced by j, 
k  and  1.  For the  same  reasons  v 12 (i,j)  should depend  on  i  and  j 
and  v  22  ( i , j , k, 1)  on  k  and  1. 
7  This  condition  reduces  to  the  condition  presented  in 
Proposition  2. 12 
X l 1 (1)  X 1 2 (1)  Xll(1)  X 1 2 (2)  X l 1 (21  X 12 (lJ  X l l  (2)  X 12 (2) 
a l l O )  a 1 2 (ll  0,48  0,1  0,32  0,1 
all.(2)  a 12  (l.)  0,24  0,1  0,56  0,1 
a1l.(1l  a 12 (2)  0,24  0,3  0,16  0,3 
all  (2)  a 1 2 (21  0,12  0,3  0,28  0,3 
Table  1.  Probability distributions period  1 
X 2 1 {l.)  X 2 2 (1)  X 2
1 (1)  X 22 (21  X2l.(21  X 22 (l)  X2l. (2)  X 22 (2) 
a 2l  (1)  a22 (1)  0,48  0,11  0,32  0,09 
a2 l  (2)  a2 2 (1)  0,24  0,08  0,56  0,12 
a 2l !!)  a22 (21  0,24  0,25  0,16  0,35 
a2l.(2)  a 22 (2)  0,12  0,3  0,28  0,3 
Table  2.  Probability distributions period  2 
The  principal  is  risk  neutral  and  minimizes  his  own  expected 
costs.  Both  agents  are  risk averse  and  have  utility functions 
of  the 
3 
form  rs-a  for  both  periods  with  a  o  if  the  agent 
chooses action 1  and  a  =  0,5 if the agent  chooses action 2.  The 
reservation  utilities  of  the  agents  are  equal  to  4.  The 
principal induces action 2  for both agents in period 1  and action 
2  for both agents  in period  2  for every observed combination of 
first  period  results. 
presented in Table  3. 
The  agents'  levels  of  utility  are 
Because  result  j  is  a  sufficient statistic for  a 12  and  i,  k  and 
1  are  no  sufficient statistics for  respectively  a  1 
2  and 
the  dynamic  mUltiple  agent  model  rewards  the  agents  in  the 
following  way.  The  first  agent's  remuneration  V11 (i,j)  depends 
on  i  and j.  Furthermore v 21 (i,j,k,l)  is affected by i,j,k and 1. 
The  second agent's remuneration v I 2 (i,j)  is independent of  i  and 
v/ (i, j , k, 1)  is  influenced  by  j,  k  and  1.  This  can  be  easily 
checked  from  Table  3. 13 
AGENT  1  AGENT  2 
V:(l,l)  0.30  2.17 
v ,'(l,2)  2.59  2.78 
V , '  (2,1)  3.09  2.17 
V , '  (2,2)  2,59  2.78 
v:(l,l,l,l)  o  1. 30 
v/(1,1,1,2)  2.07  2.61 
v:(l, 1,2, 1)  3.30  1. 35 
v,'(l,1,2,2)  o  2.54 
v,'(l,2,1,1)  o  1. 93 
v,'(l,2,1,2)  3.07  3.25 
v,'(l,2,2,1)  3.7l  1. 98 
v,'(l,2,2,2)  1.  99  3.18 
v,· (2, 1, 1, 1)  o  1. 30 
3.41  2.61 
v:(2,1,2,1)  3,87  1. 35 
v,'(2,1,2,2)  2.72  2.54 
v,'(2,2,1,1)  o  1. 93 
v:(2,2,1,2)  3.07  3.25 
v:(2,2,2,1)  3,7l  1. 98 
v,'(2,2,2,2)  1. 99  3.18 
Table  3.  Incentive  schemes:  principal agent  solution 
IV.  Conclusion 
The  controllability principle says  that  an  individual  should be 
rewarded on the basis of  the results under his  own  control.  An 
individual  controls  a  given  result  in  a  given  period  if  he  is 
able to affect the probability distribution of this result by his 
action choice. 
This principle can be studied from a  dynamic multiple agent point 
of view.  Because effort is not observable,  all possible results 
that give  new  information about  the agents'  action choices will 
be  introduced in the principal agent  solution.  Three different 
inference effects can be  defined. 
The information effect states that another agent's first  (second) 
period  result  is  introduced  in  the  first  (second)  period 14 
remuneration of the agent considered if, given his own result and 
the  other  agent's  first  (second)  period  action,  the  agent 
influences  the  probability  distribution  of  the  other  agent's 
result  by his  own  first  (second)  period action. 
The  time effect exists when another period result is introduced 
in an agent's remuneration.  With respect to the time effect, it 
can be  shown that the  second period evaluation and  remuneration 
of  the  agent will depend  on his  own  first period result. 
The combined effect considers the introduction of another agent's 
first  period  remuneration  in  an  incentive  scheme.  A  second 
period remuneration will be determined by the other agent's first 
period  result  if  this  result  is  used  for  the  first  period 
remuneration. 
Where  control  plays  a  central  role  in  the  controllability 
principle,  it is  information  about  an  agent's  actions  that  is 
crucial  in the principal agent  model  considered. 15 
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Appendix  I 
The  convexity of the objective function and the linearity of all 
constraints  in  (3)  imply  that  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions8  are 
necessary  and  sufficient  for  the  optimality  of  the  incentive 
schemes. 
The  first and  second period first order conditions with respect 




Characteristics  of  the  second  agent's  incentive  scheme  can  be 
derived in an  analogous  way. 
Lemma  1 
The  participation  constraint  for  any  implemented  strategy  for 
both  agents  is  binding  in  the  corresponding  optimal  incentive 
scheme  for  each agent. 
Proof:  Suppose  the  participation  constraint  in  (3)  is  not 
binding for agent  1.  Then  the agent's expected utility exceeds 
his  reservation utility.  If each Vll(i,j)  is replaced by 
[Vll (i, j) - E],  with  E  >  0  and  sufficiently  small,  the  expected 
8  The  Lagrange  mUltipliers associated with the  constraints 
In  (3)  are  denoted  as  ~l  and  ~2  for  the  participation 
constraints,  0\ (all)  and  0!2 (a/)  for  the  first  period  incentive 
compatibility constraints  and  0!3 (a/, i, j)  and  0!4 (a/, i, j)  for  the 
second period incentive compatibility constraints. 18 
costs  for  the  principal  can  be  reduced  and  all  the  other  con-
straints  of  the  minimization  problem  will  still be  satisfied. 
The  same  holds  for  each  v2l(i,j,k,l).  The  participation 
constraint of  agent  2  is binding for  the  same  reasons.  Q.E.D. 
Lenuna  2 
The  Lagrange  mUltiplier  on  the  second  period  incentive 
compatibility constraint is strictly positive for each agent for 
each combination  (i,j)  for at least one  second period action or 
v U, j) : :.3ai U, j) : <X3 (ai, i, j) >  0 
VU,j) ::.3aiU,j) :<x 4(ai,i,j»0 
Proof:  Suppose  0'3 (a/  f  i  I  j)  is  equal  to  0  for  some  combination 
(i,j)  and every second period action of  agent  1.  Then 
h/' (v/(i,j,k,l))  is  the  same  for  all  combinations  (k,l)  given 
first period results  (i,j).  In this case agent  1  will  choose 
an  effort  minimizing  second  period  action  for  any  combination 
(i,j).  The  same  is true  for  agent  2.  Q.E.D. 
Lenuna  3 
The  Lagrange  multiplier  on  the  first  period  incentive 
compatibility  constraint  in  (1)  is  strictly positive  for  each 
agent  for at least one  first period action or 
:.3a;: <Xl (a;) >0 
:.3a{:  <X2  (a{) >0 
Proof:  Suppose  0'1 (a/)  is  equal  to  0  for  every  first  period 
action of agent  1.  Then h l l , (Vll(i,j))  is the  same  for all combi-
nations  (i, j).  This  implies  that  VII (i, j)  is  the  same  for  all 
first period result  combinations  (i,j)  or  that  the  first  agent 
is  not  able  to  influence  VII (i, j)  by  his  first  period  action 
choice.  Also  he  is  not  able  to  influence  v/(i,j,k,l)  by  his 
first period action since  h2l (V2I (i, j , k, 1))  is not  influenced by 19 
different first period action choices of the first agent.  In this 
case  agent  1  will  choose  the  effort  minimizing  first  period 
action.  The  same  is true  for  agent  2.  Q.E.D. 
since  hat  is  a  convex  function,  hat'  is  an  increasing  function. 
A  larger hand  side  in the first order  conditions  (A.1  and  A.2) 
means  a  larger value  of  the  payment  made  in utilities.  A  base 
payment  (Lemma  1)  is  made  to both agents.  Lemma  2  and  Lemma  3 
ensure that agents'  incentive schemes  depend  on the probability 
distributions on first and  second period results. 
Proposition  1 
The second period incentive scheme of an agent will depend on his 
own  first period result. 
Proof:  Consider  the  first order conditions  with  respect  to  the 
first agent's second period incentive scheme  (A.2).  Because the 
Lagrange multiplier on  the first period incentive 
compatibility constraint is strictly positive for each agent for 
at  least  one  first  period  action  (Lemma  3),  the  first  agent's 
second  period  incentive  scheme  will  depend  on  his  own  first 
period result.  The  same  holds  for  the  second agent.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2 
The  first  agent's  first  period  optimal  evaluation  and 
remuneration  is  independent  of  the  second  agent's  first period 
result if his  own  first period result is a  sufficient statistic 
for his first period action choice  or more  specifically 
Va;:a(a;»o;Vi;Vj  (A. 3) 
Proof:  The first order condition of agent 1  with respect to his 
first period incentive scheme is given by  (A. 1).  If  (A.3)  holds, 
this  first  order  condition  can  be  reduced  to 
The optimal incentive 20 
scheme  of  agent  1  is  independent  of  the  first period result  of 
agent  2.  If  the  optimal  incentive  scheme  of  agent  1  is 
II  ( 1-2)  L 
1  [  ij  a 1 ,  a 1  independent  of  the  second  result,  1(X1(a1 )  1--"""-----:::.-
a  II  -1-2 
1  ij  (a1 ,  a 1 ) 
is 
independent  of  j.  This  is  certainly  the  case  for  Lagrange 
mUltipliers  Q\(a/)  equal  to  O.  may  not 
involve a/ unless the Lagrange multiplier vector {al (all)}  is such 
that  even  with  every  component  of  the  likelihood  ratio vector 
varying  with  j,  their  inner  product  is 
independent  of  j.  The  latter situation arises only by accident 
(Mookherjee,  1984)  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  3 
The  first agent's  second period evaluation  and  remuneration  is 
independent of the second agent's second period result if his own 
second  period  result  is  a  sufficient  statistic  for  his  second 
period action choice or more  specifically 
II  1 (k, ai (i  , j) , a~ (i  , j) ) = II  1 (k,  a~ (i  , j))  Vai (i  , j) : ex 3 (ai, i , j) >  0 ; V  k; V  j 
(A. 3) 
Proof:  The  first order condition of agent  1  with respect to his 
second  period  incentive  scheme  is  given  by  (A. 2) . 
holds,  this first order condition can be  reduced to 
If  (A.3) 21 
The  optimal  incentive  scheme  of  agent  1  is  independent  of  the 
second  period  result  of  agent  2.  The  necessity  condition  is 
proved in an  analogous  way  as  in Proposition  2.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  4 
The  first agent's  second  period evaluation  and  remuneration  is 
independent of the first period result of the second agent if the 
first period result of the first agent is a  sufficient statistic 
for his first period action choice or more  specifically 
Va;:a(a;»O;Vi;Vj  (A.4) 
Proof:  The first order condition of agent 1  with respect to his 
second  period  incentive  scheme  is  given  by  (A.2). 
holds,  this first order condition can be  reduced to 
If  (A.4) 
The  optimal  incentive  scheme  of  agent  1  is  independent  of  the 
first  period  result  of  agent  2.  The  necessity  condition  is 
proved  in an  analogous  way  as  in Proposition  2.  Q.E.D. 
Propositions 2,  3  and 4  can be formulated in an analogous way for 
the  second agent. 